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"By 'the public sphere' we mean first of all a realm of our social 
life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed. 
Access is guaranteed to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere 
comes into being in every conversation in which private individuals 
assemble to form a public body. They then behave neither like business 
or professional people transacting private affairs, nor like members 
of a constitutional order subject to the legal constraints of a state 
bureaucracy. Citizens behave as a public body when they confer in 
an unrestricted fashion--that is, with the guarantee of freedom of 
assembly and association and the freedom to express and publish their 
opinions--about matters of general interest. In a large public body 
this kind of communication requires specific means for transmitting 
information and influencing those,who receive it. Today newspapers 
and magazines, radio and TV are the media of the public sphere. We 
speak of the political public sphere in contrast, for instance, to 
the literary one, when public discussion deals with objects connected 
to the activity of the state. Although state activity is so to speak 
the executor, it is not a part of it .... Only when the exercise of 
political control is effectively subordinated to the democratic demand 
that information be accessible to the public, does the political 
public sphere win an institutionalized influence over the government 
through the instrument of law-making bodiest1. [I] 
In this summary statement Habermas reveals perhaps better than in the book itself 
how far his conception of the "public sphere" amounts to an ideal of critical liberalism 
.which remains historically unattained. History provides only distorted realizations, 
. both at the inception of the public sphere (when'the participant public was effectively 
limited to the bourgeoLsie) and with the later transformations (which removed this 
"bourgeois ideal" of informed and rational communication still further from any 
general or universal implementation). Strukturwandel der Oeffentlichkeit rests on. 
an immanent critique, in which Habermas confronts the liberal ideal of the reasoning 
public with the reality of its own particularism and long-term disempowerment. From 
a vantage-point in the late-1950s the main direction of Habermas's perspective was 
not surprisingly pessimistic--"etching an unforgettable portrait of a degraded public 
life, in which the substance of liberal democracy is voided in a combination of 
plebiscitary manipulation and privatized apathy, as any collectivity of citizenry 
disintegrates". [2] But the book was not just a story of decay. It remains a careful 
exploration of a particular historical moment, in which certain possibilities for 
human emancipation were unlocked--possibilities which for Habermas were ordered around 
the "central idea of communicatively generated rationalityw, which then became the 
leitmotif of his own life's work. [3] 
In a nutshell, the public sphere means "a sphere which mediates between society 
and state, in which the public organizes itself as the bearer of public opinion". 
Historically, its growth occurred in the later eighteenth century with the widening 
of political participation and the crystallizing of citizenship ideals. It eventuated 
from the struggle against absolutism (or in the British case from the struggle for 
a strengthening of constitutional monarchy), and aimed at transforming arbitrary 
into rational authority, subject to the scrutiny of a citizenry organized into a 
public body under the law. It was identified most obviously with the demand for 
representative government and a liberal constitution, and more broadly with the 
basic civil freedoms before the law (speech, press, assembly, association, no 
arrest without trial, and so on). But Habermas was less interested in this more 
familiar process of overtly political change. More fundamentally, the public sphere 
presumed the prior transformation of social relations, their condensation into 
new institutional arrangements, and the generation of new social, cultural, and 
political discourse around this changing environment. Conscious and programmatic 
political impulses emerged most strongly where such underlying processes were reshaping 
the overall context of social communication. The public sphere presupposed this 
larger accumulation of socio-cultural change. It was linked to the growth of urban 
culture-metropolitan and provincial--as the novel arena of a locally organized public 
life (e.g. meeting houses, concert halls, theaters, opera houses, lecture halls, 
museums), to a new infrastructure of social communication (including the press, 
publishing companies and other literary media, the rise of a reading public via 
reading and language societies, subscription publishing and lending libraries, 
improved transportation, and adapted centers of sociability like coffeehouses, 
taverns and clubs), and to a new universe of voluntary association. 
In other words, the public sphere derives only partly from the conscious 
demands of reformers and their articulation into government. Indeed, the latter 
were as much an effect of its emergence as a cause. Socially, the public sphere 
was the manifest consequence of a much deeper and long-term process of societal 
transformation--which Habermas locates between the late Middle Ages and the eighteenth 
century as a trade-driven transition from feudalism to capitalism, in which the 
capital accumulation resulting from long-distance commerce plays the key role and 
for which the mercantilist policies of the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
were the midwife. The category of "the publicn was the unintended consequence of 
long-run socio-economic change--eventually precipitated by the aspirations of a 
successful and self-conscious bourgeoisie, whose economic functions and social 
standing implied a cumulative agenda of desirable innovation. Habermas postulates 
a causal homology of culture and economics in this sense, growing from "the traffic 
in commodities and news created by early capitalist long-distance trade" [p. 153: 
on the one hand, commercialization undermined the old basis of the household economy, 
reoriented productive activity "toward a commodity market that had expanded under 
public direction and supervisionM, and reconstituted state/society relations on 
the basis of a new distinction between the private and the public; on the other 
hand, the flow of international news attendant on the growth of trading networks 
generated a new category of public knowledge/information, particularly in the context 
of the seventeenth-century wars and intensified competition among "nations" in the 
mercantilist sense, leading to a new medium of formal exchange and the invention 
of the press. This model of change, in which both new cultural possibilities and 
new political forms appear as the excrescence of an accumulating structural trans- 
formation, might be applied to a range of phenomena normally associated with ind- 
ustrialization or the developmental process. Thus, in very general terms, the 
nineteenth-century growth of local government owed much to an improvised grappling 
with the problems of an urbanizing society (poverty, policing, amenities like 
lighting and sewage, commercial licensing, revenue creation, and so on), to 
the extent of the local state being actually constituted by the practical associational 
initiatives of a new citizenry-in-the-making--but as the unintended, rolling effect 
of structurally invited interventions, as opposed to the strategic result of a 
coherent design. 
Ultimately, though, Habermas is less interested in the realized political 
dimension of the public sphere--that is, the particular political histories of 
the late-eighteenth and earlier-nineteenth centuries--than in abstracting a strong 
ideal against which later forms of the public sphere can be set. His own vantage- 
point--as the legatee of the Frankfurt School, resuming their critique of mass 
culture at the height of the CDU-state and the post-war boom, at a low ebb of 
socialist and democratic prospects--is crucial to an understanding of the book's 
motivating problematic. But while Habermas affirmed the critique of the present 
(the consciousness industry, the commodification of culture, the manipulation 
and manipulability of the masses), he specifically retrieved the past (the Enlighten- 
ment as the founding moment of modernity). By contrast with Horkheimer and Adorno, 
he upheld the Enlightenment's progressive tradition. Thus his model of the public 
sphere has an avowedly double function: as Hohendahl says, "It provides a paradigm 
for analyzing historical change, while also serving as a normative category for 
political critique". 141 Arguably, it is the latter that really drives the analysis. 
Moreover, while the public sphere argument is clearly crucial to politics in the 
full demxatic sense (as the enlargement of human emancipation), its main thrust 
is anterior to politics of the parliamentary or institutional kind. For Habermas 
the parliamentary stands of a Fox were less important than the larger context of 
rational and unrestricted discourse from which they had grown and which they could 
-... 
a% presuppose. The faculty of "publicness" begins with reading, thought, and discussion, 
:* 
X I  with reasonable exchange among equals, and it is this ideal that really focuses 
'li 
A.' Habermas's interest. It resided in the act of discussion and the process of exchange: 
'd: 
.if &. 
"The truly free market is that of cultural discourse itself, within, 
of course, certain normative regulations; ... What is said derives its 
F" legitimacy neither from itself as message nor from the social title ,'.-. . . 
:.+ Is- - 
.of the utterer, but from its conformity as a statement with a certain 
t1 
paradigm of reason inscribed in the very event of saying". [51 
T' 
", It is perhaps unclear how far Habermas believes his ideal of rational communication, 
A '  with its concomitant of free and eaual participation. to have been actually realized 
in the classical liberal model of deffentlichkkit. sometimes he acknowledgks the 
class and property-bound basis of participation, but not to the extent of compromising 
his basic historical claim.   ow ever, the modei also postulates a "structural- trans- - 
formation of the public sphere", and as suggested above, the narrowing of the 
ideal's possibilities over the longer run forms the main starting-point of the book. 
Particularly from the last third of the nineteenth century, the growing contradictions 
of a capitalist society--the passage of competitive into monopoly or organized capit- 
alism, the regulation of social conflicts by the state, and the fragmentation 
of the rational public into an arena of competing interests--serve to erode the 
independence of public opinion and undermine the legitimacy of its institutions. 
In the cultural sphere proper, from the arts to the press and the mass entertainment 
industry, the processes of commercialization and rationalization have increasingly 
targeted the individual consumer while eliminating the mediating contexts of reception 
and rational discussion, particularly in the new age of the electronic mass media. 
In this way the classic basis of the public sphere--a clear distinction between 
public good and private interest, the principled demarcation of state and society, 
and the constitutive role of a participant citizenry, defining public policy and 
its parameters through reasoned exchange, free of domination--disappears. The 
relations between state and society are reordered, to the advantage of the former 
and the detriment of a "free" political life. 
Now, the strengths and weaknesses of Habermas's work on the public sphere have 
been much discussed (though mainly in the German-speaking rather than the English- 
speaking world, it should be said), not least in the papers and sessions of the 
present conference that precede my own. [6] A certain amount of overlap is inevitable, 
and I certainly would not want to discuss the historical dimensions of the argument 
in isolation from its theoretical value. But I want to confine myself to a series 
of comments which confront Habermas's work with a corpus of intervening historical 
writing (not all of it by historians), which sometimes confirms, sometimes extends, 
and sometimes undermines his argument. These concern: (1) a wide variety of liter- 
atures which confirm the usefulness of the core concept of the public sphere; (2) the 
question of gender and the implications of women1 s history/feminist theory; (3) the 
state and politics in the strict sense; and (4) the problem of popular culture. 
The Findings of Social History 
The value of the Habermasian perspective has been fundamentally borne out by recent 
social history in a variety of fields. On re-reading the book (after originally 
discovering it in my own case in the early-1970s and then systematically engaging 
with it in the later part of that decade) it is striking to see how securely and 
imaginatively the argument is historically grounded, given the thinness of the 
literature available at the time. In this respect I am very struck by the affinity 
with the work of Raymond Williams, on whose argument in Culture and Society, 
1780-1950 (London, 1958) Habermas draws extensively in the early part of the book. 
The form of the argumentation is very similar to that of Williams (e.g. the whole 
introductory discussion culminating in the treatment of the shift in the meanings 
of the terms for I1public" in English, German, and French between the late-seventeenth 
and late-eighteenth centuries--pp. 1-26). The very method--of moving from the "world 
of letters" to the structure of society--is characteristic of Williams' project in 
his early work. The later stage of Habermas's argument about the public sphere's 
transformation/degeneration (e.g. Ch. 18: "From a Culture-Debating Public to a 
Culture-Consuming Publicw, or Ch. 20: "From the Journalism of Private Men of Letters 
to the Public Consumer Services of the Mass Media") antici~ates the broad historical 
argument of The Long Revolution (London, 1961 ) , and com&nications (Harmondsworth, 
1962). in which Williams developed his ideas about the long-term decline in the 
forms-and degree of popular access and control in the area of culture. On the. 
other hand, Williams' sbsequent work on mass media has always maintained a strong 
affirmative stance on the democratic potentials of new communications technologies 
(see especiall'y his Television: Technoloqy and Cultural Form [London, 19743, 
or the chapter on "Culture and Technology" in The Year 2000 [NY, 19831, pp. 128-521, 
and his view of film, radio, TV, popular fiction, popular music, and so on 
is far removed from the Frankfurt School's critique of mass culture and popular 
taste via the notion of commodity fetishism--a critique which it is unclear whether, 
and how far, Habermas himself would share. Incidentally, rather remarkably there 
is no entry for "public" in Williams1 Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society 
(London, 1976; revised and expanded ed. 1983). [7] 
Moving from Habermas's general approach/mode of argument to areas of research 
which fall concretely or empirically within the public sphere framework, I wish 
to mention a number of examples, which certainly don't exhaust the contexts in 
which Habermas's idea could be embodied, but which are those most familiar to me. 
These are: 
(a) A large amount of eighteenth-century British social history, mainly 
associated with the influence of 3. H. Plumb, but also including a range 
of urban history, which effectively fills in the framework Habermas 
proposed without (so far as I know) being explicitly aware of it. [8] ' 
(b) A similar literature on popular liberalism in Britain, concentrated in 
the period of Gladstone between the 1860s and 1890s, but with some 
anticipation earlier in the nineteenth century in the politics and moral 
campaigning of provincial religious Dissent. [9] 
(c) A less plentiful literature on the social context of liberalism in Germany, 
running from the social history of the Enlightenment to the period of 
unification in the 1860s. [lo] 
(d) A disparate.literature on political socialization and political mobilization 
in peasant societies, partly in social history, partly in sociology, 
and to a lesser extent in anthropology. The breaking down of parochial 
identities and the entry of rural societies into national-political cultures 
--or the-nationalization of the peasantry, as it might be called-.-is 
in one dimension the creation of local public spheres and their articulation 
with a national cultural and political arena. The. literature on rural 
politics and peasant mobilization in nineteenth-century France is especially 
interesting from this point of view. [I1 I ' 
(e) An equally disparate literature in the sociology of communications, 
- focused on the history of the press and other media, the rise of a reading - - 
public, popular literacy, and mass communications. As already mentioned 
above, the work of Raymond Williams is especially central here, together 
with a considerable body of work in British cultural studies, much of 
it filtered through the British reception of Gramsci. But another fundamental 
point of departure is the classic work of Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and 
Social Communication. An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1966; orig. ed. 1954), which has been most imaginatively 
taken up by the Czech historian Miroslav Hroch for a systematic analysis 
of the emergence of nationalities in the nineteenth century. In practice, 
in large parts of southern and eastern Europe in the later-nineteenth " century (and in the extra-European colonial world in the twentieth century) 
the emergence of nationality (i.e. the growth of a public for nationalist 
discourse) was simultaneously the emergence of a public sphere. This 
co-determination makes a large body of literature on nationalism relevant 
to the historical discussion of Habermas's idea. [I21 
What all of these literatures have in common is a f o a s m  voluntary association 
and associational life as the main medium for the definition of public commitments. 
If we take one of the above arguments about the public sphere's conditions of existence 
seriously--that it presumed the prior transformation of social relations and took 
clearest shape where the overall context of social communication was being institution- 
ally re-formed--there aregood grounds for taking voluntary association as a main 
indicator of social progress in Habermas's sense. In fact, Habermas treats this 
subject himself to some extent by noting the importance of reading and literary 
societies to the new public aspirations. But the confluence of these older eighteenth- 
century associations (reading societies, patriotic clubs, political discussion 
circles, freemasonry, other secret societies) with more specific political ambitions 
during the era of the French Revolution, and with the desire for social prestige 
on the part cf the emergent bourgeoisie, also produced a more visible push for 
social leadership and domination. Thus throughout Germany in the early decades 
of the nineteenth century the urban and small-town bourgeoisie crystallized their 
nascent claims to social primacy by forming themselves into an exclusive social 
club, usually called something like llHarmonyl', Concordia, Ressource, or Union. 
A club of this kind was the matrix for the formation of a local elite. It acquired 
its own buildings, recruited only the most prestigious pillars of local society 
(who might number some thirty businessmen, merchants, lawyers, doctors, and 
civil servants in a local population of some 6,000 at the start of the century), 
admitted new members only by careful election, offered a wide range of social 
facilities (including the reading room), and organized balls, concerts, banquets 
and lectures. It was the obvious center of political discussion, and generated 
a variety of philanthropic, charitable and recreational activities in the community 
at large. Thus in Heilbronn in south-west Germany the Harmony had its own building 
with club rooms, reading rooms, library, and a surrounding park called the 
"Shareholders' Gardenv. It was the center of a fine web of informally organized 
activity radiating into the local social scene. Indeed, the visible performance 
of civic duties was vital to a notable's moral authority in the town, whether by 
sitting in charitable or philanthropic committees, improving public amenities, 
patronizing the arts, promoting education, organizing public festivals, or 
commemorating great events. [ 131 
Such associational initiatives were fundamental to the formation of a bourgeois 
civil society [burqerliche Gesellschaft ] in nineteenth-century Germany, in ways 
that are intimated and assumed in Habermas's text, but which perhaps lack the 
necessary concrete elaboration for the nineteenth century. Put simply, voluntary 
association was in principle the logical form of bourgeois emancipation and bourgeois 
self-affirmation. This was true in three strong ways. First, the ideal and practice 
of association were explicitly hostile, by both organization and intent, to older 
principles of corporate organization, which ascribed social place by hereditary 
and legal estate. By contrast, the new principle of association offered an altern- 
ative means of expressing opinion and forming taste, which defined an independent 
public space beyond the legal prescriptions of status and behavior of the monarchical 
and/or absolutist state. It is central to Habermas's conception of the public sphere 
in this sense. Second, sociologically, associationism reflected the growing 
strength and density of the social, personal and family ties among the educated 
and propertied bourgeoisie [Bildunq und Besitz]. It described a public arena where 
the dominance of the bourgeoisie would naturally run. It was the constitutive 
organizational form of a new force for cultural and political change, viz. the 
natural social power and self-consciously civilized values.of a bourgeoisie starting 
to see itself as a "generalM or wuniversal" class. Third, voluntary association 
was the primary context of expression for bourgeois aspirations to the general 
leadership of nineteenth-century society. It provided the theatrical scaffolding 
for the nineteenth-century bourgeois drama. In this context the underlying principles 
of bourgeois life--economic, social, moral--were publicly acted out and consciously 
institutionalized into a model for the other classes, particularly the petty 
bourgeoisie and the working class, who became the objects of philanthropic support 
and cultural edification. [14] 
Now, the treatment of this theme in nineteenth-century German historiography 
is rather truncated, mainly because the liberal ideal of emancipation (to which 
the arguments from voluntary association and the public sphere are hitched) is usually 
thought to have been decisively blocked by the 1860s and 1870s: if liberalism in 
Bismarckian and Wilhelmine Germany was such a broken reed, historians have seen 
little point in studying the emancipatory purposes of local assocational life. If 
the main story was of decline and degeneration (of liberalism and the public sphere), 
then the value of looking at the associational arena has tended to fall. 1153 We 
can find a stronger coverage of such matters, therefore, in a national historiography 
where the unity of the bourgeoisieqs social progress and liberal political success 
have remained intact in historiansq understanding, viz. that of Britain. 
For many years 3. H. Plumb's The Growth of Political Stability in Enqland, 
1675-1725 (London, 1967) was one of the few texts keeping open a broader and more 
developed approach to eighteenth-century British politics, as o ~ ~ o s e d  to the 
narrow' interest-based conception of high politics' that had come to dominate the 
field in general. In the intervening two decades Plumb himself published a series 
of essays which carried this further and explored the cultural changes that allowed 
something like a free political life to begin to take shape. Though the shadow 
o f  a theory barely darkens his pages, Plumb's contributions fall interestingly 
within the framework Habermas lays out, concerning things like the growth of a 
reading public, the commercialization of leisure, expanding educational provision, 
the transition from private-to public entertainment, and the general spread of 
such trends from the capital to the provinces. In effect, this amounted to the 
gradual coherence of a self-conscious middle-class public, which wore its provincialism 
less as an embarassment than as an expression of buoyant creativity. [16] Moreover, 
Plumb has inspired a wider body of work, for which John Brewer's study of politics 
in the 1760s is a splendid example. While Brewer tackles the structure of politics 
in general, his most important chapters concern the impact of extra-parliamentary 
activity on the parliamentary arena. His chapter on the press covers the entire 
institutional fabric of public debate in the 1760s, including the nature of literacy, 
media of publication (newspapers, periodicals, pamphlets, squibs, handbills, 
songs), the complexities of literary production (as in the seasonality and varied 
media of circulation), the discrepancies between circulation and actual readership, 
the role of "bridging" ( "the transmission of printed information in traditional 
oral forms", as in ballads), the social universe of coffee-house and club, and 
the spread of postal and turnpike communications. He adds an analysis of the ritual 
and symbolic content of crowd behavior during the Wilkite manifestations which deepens 
George Rudk8s classic treatment and tells us much about the nascent forms of a new 
popular politics. When combined with the substantive treatments of mid-century 
radicalism and its transformations (particularly via the impact of the American 
radicals), these discussions present "an alternative structure of politics" which 
in the conjunctures of the 1780s and 1790s had major democratic and oppositional 
implications. How far the "alternative structure" coincided, organizationally, 
sociologically and ideologically, with the emergence of the public sphere described 
by Habermas is a moot question (which I will return to under my fourth section 
below). But for present purposes, we may simply note the detailed embodiment of 
a novel notion of the "public1'. [17] 
John Money's study of the West Midlands, likewise -influenced by Plumb, makes 
a related contribution. Money is concerned with the transition from a rural to 
a mainly urban-industrial society and with the cultural adaptations that managed 
to contain much of the potential for social conflict in the new manufacturing center 
of Birmingham. He suggests that Birmingham's social, economic and political integr- 
ation within the wider county community of Warwick was strengthened rather than 
fractured by the experience of urban growth, and between the 1760s and 1790s this 
cultural resilience allowed a new sense of regional identity to form. This claim 
is explored through careful analyses of the local notables--Birmingham merchants 
and manufacturers--who both kept their links with the county landowners via projects 
like the Birmingham General Hospital and societies like the Bean Club and the 
masonic lodges, and defined a separate identity vis-a-vis London and the other 
regions. Naturally, the process of regional development was not without tensions, 
and Money devotes much space to the unfolding of religious and other ideological 
disagreements, and to the emergence 0f.a more popular radicalism. But in the end 
neither the hostilities of Anglicanism and Dissent nor the pressure for reform nor 
the promise of Jacobinism were strong enough to tear the fabric of regional community. 
[ 183 
More than anything else, Money's book is a study of regional political 
culture. With Brewer he shares an intimate knowledge of the structure of public 
discourse in the chosen period--not just the press, but the public spectacle of 
music and the stage, the associational milieu of "taverns, coffee houses and 
clubs", and the literary world of "printing, publishing and popular instruction" 
--what Money calls ''the means of communication and the creation of opinionu. It 
becomes clear from this kind of analysis that the origins of an independent political 
life--i.e. a public sphere in Habermas's sense--must be sought in this wider domain 
of cultural activity, from which a self-confident "middle classm (to substitute 
the English for the German designation) began to emerge. The foundations were laid 
before Brewer's and Money's period between the 1680s and 1760s in what has been 
called an "English urban renaissance", when the growth of towns, new patterns 
of personal consumption, expanding demand for services, professions and luxury 
trades, and the commercialization of leisure all combined to stimulate a new culture 
of organized recreation, public display, improved amenities, and urban aesthetics. 
[I91 But it was in the later part of the eighteenth century, with the commercializ- 
ation that produced "the birth of a consumer societyn, and the growing differentiation 
and self-consciousness of 'Ithe middling sort or bourgeoisie" (the "men of moveable 
property, members of professions, tradesmen and shopkeepers1' who comprised some 
"million of the nation's nearly seven million" inhabitants, and strove for independent 
space between the "client economy" of the aristocracy and the real dependence of 
the laboring poor), that the political consequences of this process could flourish. 
1201 
Money shows how the latter could happen in very practical ways. First, the 
extension of formal culture to the provinces presupposed some public place in which 
performances and concerts could be held. Hence the phenomenon of the assembly room 
built by private subscription, where the social elite could meet for balls, music, 
lectures and theater, what Plumb calls a "transitional stage between private and 
fully public entertainmentv. [27] Such assemblies were sustained by associational 
action, which in Birmingham extended from the freemasons and other secret circles, 
to an elite formation like the Bean Club, or equally exclusive intellectual groups 
like the Lunar Society and reading societies. From this crystallized a wider sense 
of cultural and political identity, for which the building of the Birmingham General 
Hospital between 1765 and 1779 by private subscription was the archetypal case. 
The Hospital's triennial music festivals established themselves as major occasions 
for the gathering of the West Midlands1 leading families, playing a key part in 
attracting patronage and realizing the town's cultural ambitions. [22] Second, 
new networks of communication seem especially important, not just because the press 
and a reading public ease the exchange of information and ideas, but in the larger 
sense of providing a new institutional context for political action. Money stresses 
the canal building of the last third of the century, which had an enormous effect 
in solidifying the new regional and eventually national identities. The floating 
of a canal scheme entailed an entire repertoire of political initiatives (the creation 
of new regional political networks, deliberate cultivation of public opinion, 
participation within the national parliamentary institutions, widespread lobbying 
of the affected private and public intererests), which eventually culminated in 
the call for a more rational public authority to expedite the whole unwieldy process. 
This last was key, for to avoid the duplication of projects and an anarchy of 
particularistic interests there developed an urgent need to rationalize the activity, 
and this was increasingly done by reference to some larger "national interest". 
As Money says, such conflicts became best handled by an appeal to Parliament "as 
mediator between the public interest on the one hand and private property and enterprise 
on the otherv [23]  In the related area of road building such resolution was achieved 
by inventing the institution of the turnpike trust. As a third case we may cite 
the abortive General Chamber of Manufacturers of Great Britain formed between 1785 
and 1787 as a shortlived response to some of the government's fiscal measures. 
~hough indifferently successful outside the West Midlands and Manchester, this 
further solidified regional networks and simultaneously oriented them toward national 
institutions, both existing (Parliament) and notional (a national market). 
Now, illustrative analysis of this kind, which puts Habermas's idea to work, 
can be easily duplicated, because the formation of political culture in this sense 
has been a fundamental dimension of the capitalist developmental process (except, 
one should immediately say, where the latter has been imposed from above or without 
by authoritarian vanguards in situations of extreme societal "backwardness"). But 
how are we to judge Habermas's idea in its light? The basic point is clear enough, 
viz. the relationship of the new liberal values of the later-eighteenth and early- 
nineteenth centuries to definite developmental processes of class formation and 
social growth (the transition from feudalism to capitalism as Habermas describes 
it, with the concomitant rise of the bourgeoisie). For Brewer no less than for 
Habermas, a particular ideological structure/cultural formation (liberalism, the 
ideal of emancipation grounded in rational communication, the Enlightenment discourse 
of freedom) is the complex effect of a socio-economic developmental process (the 
transition, tise of capitalism, commercialization, birth of a consumer society), 
mediated via the novel institutional structures of the public sphere. [ 2 4 ]  At one 
level Habermas shows how the genesis of the liberal tradition can be grounded in 
a particular social history, and analyses such as Brewer's or Money's are an excellent 
concretizing of that project. 
On the other hand, what are the problems? Basically, Habermas confines his 
discussion too much to the bourgeoisie. In his Preface Habermas does specifically 
limit himself to "the liberal model of the bourgeois public spherew (p. XVIII) on 
the grounds of its dominance, distinguishing it from both "the plebeian public 
spherew associated with the Jacobin phase of the French Revolution, which later 
manifested itself in Chartism and the anarchist strains of the continental labor 
movement, and "the plebiscitary-acclamatory form of regimented public sphere charact- 
erizing dictatorships in highly developed industrial societies" (by which he presumably 
means fascism). The reference to these alternative forms is too cryptic to allow 
any sensible speculation about what Habermas means in detail, but he does describe 
the plebeian version as being "suppressed in the historical process1' and in any 
case "oriented toward the intentions of the bourgeois public sphere" (and therefore 
a dependent variant). I will be returning to this point again below. But here I 
want to stress the variable origins of Oeffentlichkeit. The virtue of llpublicness" 
could materialize other than by the intellectual transactions of a polite and literate 
bourgeois milieu. Despite the best efforts of the latter precisely to appropriate 
such a function to itself and to establish exclusive claims on the practice of reason, 
"private people putting reason to use" (Habermas, p. XVIII) could also be found 
elsewhere. In this respect we can make three important points: 
(i) The liberal disideratum of reasoned exchange also became available for 
non-bourgeois subaltern groups, whether the radical intelligentsia of 
Jacobinism and its successors or wide sections of -social classes like 
the peasantry or the working class. Whether in literary (the production 
and circulation/diffusion of ideas) or political (the adoption of constit- 
utions and liberties under the law) terms, the global ideological climate 
encouraged peasant and working-class voices to strive for the same emancip- 
atory.language. That is, the positive values of the liberal public sphere 
quickly acquired broader democratic resonance, with the resulting emergence 
of impressive popular movements, each with their own distinctive movement 
cultures (i .e. forms of public sphere). Now, it's open to question how 
far these were simply derivative of the liberal model (as Habermas argues), 
and how far they possessed their own dynamics of emergence and peculiar 
forms of internal life. There is enough evidence from the literature 
on Owenism, Chartism and British popular politics and on the forms of 
political sociability in the French countryside to take this argument 
seriously. [ 2 5 ]  Some recent writing has stressed Chartism's confinement 
in an inherited political framework and its indebtedness to a given language 
of political opposition, it is true. 1261 But we can see such a movement 
as in one sense "a child of the eighteenth centuryw (Habermas, p. XVIII), 
and therefore bound by a dominant model, and at the same time acknowledge 
its historical specificity and autonomous forms of expression. In particular, 
Habermas's oppositions of weducated/uneducated" and "literate/illiterateV 
simply don't work, because (as we shall see) the liberal public sphere 
was faced at the very moment of its appearance by not only a "plebeian" 
public that was disabled and easily suppressed, but also a radical one 
that was combative - and highly literate. 
(ii) Because of the international impact of the French Revolution, the liberal 
political ideal encapsulated by the concept of the public sphere was made 
available in many parts of Europe way ahead of the long-run social transforrn- 
ations, which in western Europe form the starting-point of Habermas's 
argument. All over east-central and southern Europe, and frequently 
representing little more than themselves, small groups of intellectuals 
responded to the French Revolution and its legacy by lodging their own 
claims to nationhood. The French experience bequeathed a political vocabulary 
in which such new aspirations could be engaged, a structured ideological 
discourse of rights and self-government into which such emergent intellig- 
entsias might naturally insert themselves. The encounter with revolutionary 
France induced conscious reflection not only on the circumstances of 
political dependence in which such societies invariably found themselves, 
but also on the associated handicaps of socio-economic backwardness. 
Indeed, the radical departures of the French Revolution not only gave 
sympathetic intellectuals in more "backward" societies a new political 
language for articulating their own aspirations, it also allowed them 
to conceptualize their situations as "backwardnessI1 to begin with. It 
interpellated them in that sense via the new forms of nationalist political 
address. Armed with the new political consciousness, they then set about 
constituting a national public sphere in all the ways discussed above--from 
literary societies, subscription networks, the press, and a national 
reading public, to the gymnastic and sharpshooter clubs, and the popular 
reading rooms that carried the activity into the countryside--but with 
the crucial differences: (a) that it was stimulated from the outside 
rather than being the spontaneous outgrowth of indigenous social development, 
in response to backwardness rather than progress; and (b) that it was 
consciously expansive rather than narrowly restrictive, oriented toward 
proselytizing among the people rather than closing ranks against them. 1273 
(iii) It is important to acknowledge the existence of competinq publics--not just 
later in the nineteenth century when Habermas presents the fragmentation 
of the classical liberal model-of Oeffentlichkeit, .but at every stage 
in the history of the public sphere, and indeed from the very beginning. 
I've argued immediately above in (i) and (ii) that emancipatory activity 
meeting Habermas's criteria could originate in ways which seem not to 
be encompassed in his classical model (in popular peasant and working-class 
movements, and in nationalist activity ) . His concept ion is needlessly 
restrictive in other ways too. H e  both idealizes its bourgeois character 
(by neglecting the ways in which its elitism blocked and consciously 
repressed possibilities of broader participation/emancipation) - and ignores 
alternative sources of an emancipatory impulse in popular radical traditions 
(such as- the dissenting traditions studied by Edward Thompson and Christopher 
Hill). [28] By subsuming all possibilities into his Illiberal model of 
the bourgeois public sphere", Habermas misses this diversity. More to 
the point, he misses the extent to which the public sphere was always 
constituted by conflict. The emergence of a bourgeois public was never 
defined solely by the struggle against absolutism and traditional authority, 
but necessarily addressed the problem of popular containment as well. 
The classic model was already being subverted at the point of its formation, 
as the actions of subordinate classes threatened to redefine the meaning 
and extent of the "citizenryf1; and who 'is to say that the discourse of 
the London Corresponding Society was any'less "rational" than that of, 
say, the Birmingham Lunar Society (let alone the Birmingham Bean Club)? 
Consequently, the "public sphere" makes more sense as the structured 
setting where cultural and ideological contest or negotiation among a 
variety of publics takes place, rather than as the spontaneous and class- 
specific achievement of the bourgeoisie in some sufficient sense. I will 
return to this point again below. 
Gender and the Public Sphere 
So far I have considered Habermas's idea mainly in its own terms, by elaborating on 
what I take to be his conception of bourgeois culture and seeing how the latter 
might be concretized by using bodies of recent work in social history; and I have 
begun-to indicate some of the ways in which his limitation of the public sphere 
model to the bourgeoisie starts to become problematic in this light. In fact, 
Habermas's idea works best as the organizing category of a specifically liberal 
view of the transition to the modern world and of the ideal bases on which political 
and intellectual life should be conducted. But his model of how reason in this 
sense is attained--of a "subjectivity originating in the interiority of the conjugal 
family" (p. 51) becoming conscious first of itself and then of a wider domain of 
communicative human relations, travelling into a larger associational arena (book 
clubs, reading societies, salons, etc.) of literary-intellectual exchange and 
rational-critical debate, and then replicating itself in a political public sphere 
of property-owners--is an extremely idealized abstraction from the political cultures 
that actually took shape at the end of the eighteenth and start of the nineteenth 
century. At one level this is a familiar historian's complaint: "realityw was 
more ucomplicated" than that (and too complicated for any theory to be adequate, 
it is often implied); and indeed the kind of associational initiatives discussed 
above were certainly subject to a messier set of particular causalities than Habermas 
appears to allow, at least for the purposes of his immediate theorization. But 
this is rot justarretter of "the facts" and getting them straight. The formation 
of Birmingham's later-eighteenth century associational networks, or the creation 
of an elite club in early-nineteenth century German small towns, or the creation 
of literary societies in mid-nineteenth century Bohemia all involved questions of 
interest, prestiqe, and power, as well as those of rational communication. The 
public sphere in its classical liberal/bourgeois guise was partial and narrowly'based 
in that sense, and was constituted from a field of conflict, contested meanings, 
' and exclusion. 
The most consistent of these exclusions--preceding and outlasting, for instance, 
the calling into question of the public sphere's boundaries on the criterion of 
class--is based on gender. Now, Nancy Fraser has done an excellent job of facing 
Habermas's basic categories of social analysis--the systemically integrated domains 
of the economy and state, and the socially integrated domains of the lifeworld 
(viz. the private sphere of the family and the public sphere of citizenship), where 
each constitutes a distinct action-context (of functionally driven transactions 
secured via the media of money and power; and of value driven interactions focused 
on intersubjective consensus), corresponding to processes of material and symbolic 
reproduction respectively--with the "gender subtextw that runs continuously through 
these separations. As she says, in Habermas's theory the economic and state systems 
are simultaneously "disengaged or detached from the lifeworld" and then "related 
to and embedded in itm; the systems have to be situated "within the lifeworld.. .in 
a context of everyday meanings and norms", and for this purpose the lifeworld "gets 
differentiated into two spheres that provide appropriate complementary environments 
for the two systemsH--viz. "the 'private sphere1 or modern, restricted, nuclear 
family ... linked to the (official) economic system" via the medium of monetary exchange; 
and "the 'public sphere' or space of political participation, debate, and opinion 
formation ... linked to the state-administrative system1' via the exchange medium of 
power. To cut a long and extremely careful critique short, Fraser concludes that 
the addition of the gender perspective cuts through the structure of distinctions 
Habermas maintains: 
"Once the gender-blindness of Habermas's model is overcome, however, 
all these connections come into view. It then becomes clear that 
. feminine and masculine gender identity run like pink and blue threads 
through the areas of paid work, state administration and citizenship 
as well as through the domain of familial and sexual relations. This 
is to say that gender identity is lived out in all arenas of life. It 
, is one (if not the) 'medium of exchange1 among all of them, a basic 
element of the social glue that binds them to one another1'. 1291 
I want to take this basic feminist critique as understood, and confine myself 
to a few general observations about the directions of some recent historical work. 
First, an accumulating tradition of feminist critique has shown how far modern 
political thought is highly gendered in its basic structures, particularly in the 
context of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution when the key elements.of 
liberal and democratic discourse were originally formed. Thus the constitutive moment 
of modern political understanding was itself constituted by newly conceived or 
rearranged assumptions about woman and man: this was not only registered in the 
practical achievements of constitutions, legal codes, and political mobilization 
and their forms of justification, but also ordered the higher philosophical discourse 
around the universals of reason, law, and nature, grounding it in an ideologically 
constructed system of differences in gender. The elaboration of this system was 
complex, and need not concern us in detail here. Without questioning the continuity 
of women's oppression in earlier periods and societies, there is a strong case for 
seeing the form of women's exclusion from political participation and civil rights 
as the historically specific consequence of processes that worked themselves out 
in the context of the French Revolution. The new category of the "public mann and 
his "virtue" was constructed via a series of oppositions to "femininity', which both 
mobilized older conceptions of domesticity and women's place and rationalized them 
into a formal claim concerning women's "nature". At the most fundamental level, 
particular constructions of "womanness~ defined the quality of being a "man", so 
that the natural identification of sexuality and desire with the feminine allowed 
the social and political construction of masculinity. In the rhetoric of the 1780s 
and 1790s reason was counterposed conventionally to "femininity, if by the latter 
we mean (as contemporaries did) pleasure, play, eroticism, artifice, style, 
politesse, refined facades, and particularityu. [30] Given this mannered frivolity, 
women.were to be silenced to allow masculine speech--in the language of reason--full 
rein. 
Thus the absence of women from the political realm "has not been a chance occurr- 
ence, nor merely a symptom of the regrettable persistence of archaic patriarchies", 
but a specific product of the French Revolutionary era. In addition to the other 
radical departures of that time, modern politics was also constituted "as a relation 
of genderu. 1311 Moreover, the very breakthrough to new systems of conxitutional 
legality--in which social relations were reordered by conceptions of right, citizenship, 
and property, and by new definitions of the public and the private--nec.essarily 
forced the issue of woman's place, because the codification of participation allowed 
--indeed required--conceptions of gender difference to be brought into play. As 
Landes says, this occurred via "a specific, highly gendered bourgeois male discourse 
that depended on women's domesticity and the silencing of 'public' women, of the 
aristocratic and popular classes"; and "the collapse of the older patriarchy gave 
, way to a more pervasive genderinq of the public sphere". [32] This obviously has 
major implications for Habermas's argument. He is certainly not unaware of the 
exclusion of women from the nineteenth-century polities or of the patriarchal nature 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth-century family (see e.g. pp. 43-56, or p. 132). 
But these matters are assimilated to his general notion of the widening discrepancy 
between ideal and reality in the nineteenth-century history of the public sphere, 
and the major,ambiguity at the center of Habermas's thinking (the abstraction of 
an ideal of communicative rationality from historical appearances that were always . 
already imperfect in its terms) lessens the force of the recognition. In fact, 
the critique of women's subordination can proceed at two levels. On the one hand, 
there is the synthetic attack on patriarchy as a continuous figure of European political 
thought from Hobbes through Locke to the Enlightenment and beyond. Women are essentially 
confined within the household. "Within this sphere, women's functions of child-bearing, 
child-rearing and maintaining the household are deemed to correspond to their unreason, 
disorderliness and 'closeness' to nature. Women and the domestic sphere are viewed 
as inferior to the male-dominated 'public' world of civil society and its culture, 
property, social power, reason and freedom". [33] But on the other hand, the 
beauty of Landes' analysis is to have shown how this pattern of subordination was 
reformulated and recharged in the midst of the major political cataclysm--the French 
Revolution--through which the ideal of human emancipation was otherwise radically 
enlarged. In other words, Habermas's model of rational communication was not just 
vitiated by persisting patriarchal structures of an older sort; the very inception 
of the public sphere was itself shaped by a new exclusionary ideology directed at 
women. As Carol Pateman puts it: 
"In a world presented as conventional, contractual and universal, 
women's civil position is acriptive, defined by the*natural particul- 
arity of being women; patriarchal subordination is socially and 
legally upheld throughout civil life, in production and citizenship 
as well as in the family. Thus to explore the subjection of women is 
also to explore the fraternity of men". 1341 
Second, the story of associational activity may also be retold in gendered 
terms--i.e. by highlighting the exclusionary treatment of women, not just as an 
additive retrieval of a previously neglected aspect, but as an insight that fundam- 
entally reconstructs our sense of the whole. Again, simply invoking traditional 
patriarchal structures to explain the exclusion of women from politics is perhaps 
too easy: as Catherine Hall says, middle-class men had not been involved in the 
English political process before the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, 
and given the general radicalism of the road that led to 1832 the marginalization 
of middle-class women from this process--i.e. why the attack on traditional values 
stopped short of patriarchy--needs some specific explanation. [35] In supplying 
the latter, Davidoff and Hall have stressed both the constitutive importance of 
gender (i .e. the historically specific structuring of sexual difference) in the 
ordering of the middle-class social world (via particular structures of family and 
domesticity , and particular styles of consumption) and the reciprocal interactions 
between this private sphere and the public sphere of associational life and politics, 
in which the latter both reflected and actively reproduced the gendered distinctions 
of class identity generated between home and work. 1361 At a time of enormous socio- 
economic and political disorder (from the 1790s to the 1840s), "Middle-class farmers, 
manufacturers, merchants and professionals ..., critical of many aspects of aristo- 
cratic privilege and power, sought to translate their increasing economic weight 
into a moral and cultural authority ... not only within their own communities and 
boundaries, but in relation to other classes"; and they did so via the same assoc- 
iational trajectory (from informal family/friendship/religious/business networks, 
through clubs and coffeehouses, to public voluntary associations of a philanthropic- 
cum-charitable, scientific/cultural/educational, business/professional/property-related, 
and political-campaigning kind) which I have argued carried Habermas's public sphere 
concretely into existence. But--and this is the point to note here--this activity 
strictly demarcated the roles of men and women via a mobile repertoire of ideologies 
and practices, which consistently assigned women to a non-political private sphere, 
"having at most a supportive role to play in the rapidly expanding political world 
of their fathers, husbands and brothers". [37] Davidoff and Hall present this 
gendering of the public sphere in a remarkable richness of detail. It is salutary 
to substitute their summary description for the characterization of the associational 
context of the public sphere unfolded above: 
vMiddle-class men's claims for new forms of manliness found one of 
their most powerful expressions in formal associations. The informal, 
convivial culture of eighteenth-century merchants, traders and farmers 
was gradually superseded by the age of societies. Men organized them- 
selves in myriad ways, promoting their economic interests, providing 
soup kitchens for the poor, cultivating the arts, reaching into 
populated urban areas and rural outposts. This network of association 
redefined civil society, creating new arenas of social power and 
constructing a formidable base for middle-class men. Their societies 
provided opportunities for the public demonstration of middle-class 
weight and responsibility; the newspaper reports of their events, the 
public rituals and ceremonials designed for their occasions, the new 
forms of public architecture linked to their causes. The experience of 
such associations increased the confidence of middle-class men and contr- 
ibuted to their claims for political power, as heads of households, 
representing their wives, children, servants and other dependants. 
This public world was consistently organized in gendered ways and had 
little space for women. Indeed, middle-class women in the second half 
of the nineteenth century focused many of their efforts on attempting 
to conquer the bastions of this public world, a world which had been 
created by the fathers and grandfathers". [38] 
Third, this separation of spheres--between the masculine realm of public activity 
and the feminine realm of the home, which certainly didn't preclude (and was finely 
articulated with) relations of interconnectedness between business/occupation and 
household, and engendered a particular conception of the public and the private 
for the emergent nineteenth-century middle class [39]--was replicated in the situation 
of the working class. In most of the early democratic movements of the late-eighteenth 
and early-nineteenth centuries, with the significant exception of the followers 
of Owen, Fourier and some other utopian socialists, popular sovereignty was basically 
a male preserve. Chartism in Britain, as the strongest and most impressive of 
these movements, is a good example, because the famous Six Points for the democrat- 
ization of the constitution drawn up in 1837-38 expressly excluded votes for women. 
While individual Chartists raised the issue intermittently thereafter, the enduring 
consensus (shared by the movement's women no less than the men) was that female 
suffrage deserved a low priority. This was even clearer elsewhere in movements 
of peasants, shopkeepers and artisans, where democratic aspirations were practically 
linked to the economics of small-scale household production and to a sexual division 
of labor in which women had a significant but subordinate place. By the end of 
the nineteenth century European socialist parties had certainly put women's political 
rights into their programs. But it's worth recalling how little female suffrage 
had actually progressed before 1914, with women enjoying the vote only in parts 
of the North American West and just four of today's parliamentary states--New Zealand 
( 1893), Australia ( 1903), Finland ( 1906), and Norway ( 1913)--interestingly all 
of them frontier states in one way or another. 
The reasons for such entrenched discrimination were naturally complex, but 
ultimately had to do with ideas about the llnaturalnessll of woman's place and the 
proper social ordering of sexual difference. Women had no-autonomous political 
standing in the prevailing theories of government and representation. As Sally 
Alexander says: !'The legal, economic and political subject in radical popular 
speech reaching back to the seventeenth-century Levellers, was the propertied indiv- 
idual, and the propertied individual was always masculine--whether head of household, 
skilled tradesman or artisan whose property was his labor". Inscribed in the political 
language of radical democracy were definite notions of masculinity and femininity 
organized around a clear distinction between the public world and a domestic-cum- 
communal sphere, where patriarchal "notions of labor, property and kin" structured 
--and limited--uwomenls 'access to knowledge, skill and independent political subject- 
ivity". Women were highly active in Chartism and other radical agitations of the 
early nineteenth century. But when they spoke, they did so within the walls of 
the embattled popular community itself. It fell to men to speak to the outside 
world. "in the first person for thecommunity as a wholet1. Public discourse in the 
full sense, involving the whole field of-popular socio-economic discontents,. campaigns 
for civil freedoms, struggles over the law, and the demand for the vote, was closed 
to women. -It was conducted as "a dialogue of negotiation between the men of the 
communities and the ruling class--'capitalists and lawgivers'". [401 
For the various groups of radical working men--viz. "the small master craftsmen, 
the displaced domestic worker, the artisan and mechanic, the skilled factory 
operatives" who provided the backbone of Chartism and the related movements--the 
integrity of the household was constitutive for political identity; and whatever 
cpmplementarities and reciprocities there may have been between men and women in 
the household division of labor, as a system of domestic authority the family was 
centered on masculine privilege. Thus in voicing their anger against the advance 
of capitalist industry, which undermined their skills and pulled their wives and 
children into the factory, radical artisans were also defending their own sexual 
and economic regime in the family. In their minds "their status as fathers and 
heads of families was indelibly associated with their independence through 'honorable' 
labor and property in skill, which identification witha trade gave them". Women, 
by contrast, had no access to such independence. In their own right they were 
excluded from most trades and could practice a craft only by virtue of their male 
kin. Usually, they l'assistedv the latter. Her was in the household, 
her "property in the virtue of her person!'. But "separated from the home, her 
family and domestic occupations, or outside the bonds of matrimony, a woman was 
assured of neither1'. Logically enough, a woman's political identity was subsumed 
in that of the man, and it was no accident that the rare proponents of female 
suffrage among the Chartists also limited their advocacy to llspinsters and widows1', 
because wives and husbands were simply deemed to be one. [41] 
This thinking was easily adapted to the changed circumstances of industrializ- 
ation. The manner of the adjustment was already signalled by the calls for llprotective" 
laws that became especially clamorous in the 1830s and 1840s: demanding the protection 
of women and children against the degrading and brutalizing effects of work in the 
new mills, they also reflected the desire for an idealized notion of family, hearth 
and home, where benign patriarchy and healthy parental authority ordered the household 
economy by the "natural differences and capacities1' of women and men. When wives 
and children were forced into the factory by the unemployment or depressed earning 
power of the husband-father, this natural order was upset. To this dissolution 
of moral roles--the "unsexing o f  the manM, in Engels1 phrase--were then added the 
effects of women's cheap labor, whose increasing utilization by the new capitalists 
spelled a loss of jobs, status and skill for the skilled man. Whatever the real 
basis of these fears, this fusion of economic and ideological anxieties--resistance 
to the capitalist reorganization of industry, and the desire to quarantine the 
family's moral regime--proved a potent combination for those categories of skilled 
workers strong enough actually to secure a strong bargaining position for themselves. 
1421 In the new prosperity and greater political stability in British society after 
1850, such groups of workers were able to come into their own. 
The result was a recharged domestic ideology of masculine privilege, whose 
realistic attainment was now confined to those groups of skilled workingmen able 
to support a wife and children on the strength of their own earning-power alone. 
The nature of the labor market for most men--involving the irregularity, casualness, 
and seasonality of most unskilled and much skilled employment, with the connected 
difficulties of *low, irregular wages and weak organization--ensured that male 
earnings had to be supplemented by whatever income the wife and the rest of the 
family could produce, usually in casual, sweated or home-based employment or in 
the locally based informal economy. Measured by the rest of the working class, 
therefore, the position of the skilled craftsman able to keep his wife in domesticated 
non-employment was becoming an extremely privileged one--not just in relation to 
women, but in relation to the mass of unskilled males too. Trade unionism before 
the 1890s was virtually predicated on this system of exclusion, and the new ideal 
of the "family wageu was a principal mechanism separating the small elite of trade 
unionized craftsmen from the mass of ordinary workers. But not only did it strengthen 
the material advantages enjoyed by the craft elite. It also postulated a normative 
definition of women's employment as something exceptional and undesiraSle, and 
delivered ideological justifications for "keeping women in their placew--or, at 
least, for not according their interests the same priority as male workers' in 
trade union terms--that proved persuasive far outside the ranks of the labor aristocrats 
themselves, and became a pervasive feature of working-class attitudes towards women's 
political status. Thus it was a paradox of socialist politics before 1914 that parties- 
which were in many ways the staunchest advocates of women's rights in the political 
arena had also originated in the activism of skilled workers who practised the worst 
systems of craft exclusiveness against women--both in immediate terms and in terms 
of the larger social discrimination/subordination they implied. As we know from 
the scholarship of the last two decades, the socialist tradition's official 
supportiveness for women's rights usually concealed a practical indifference to 
giving them genuine priority in the  movement.'^ agitation. More basically, such 
political neglect was linked to attitudes and ~ractices deeply embedded in the 
material conditions of working-class everyday life, at work, in the neighborhood, 
and at home. Behind the labor movement's neglect of women's issues were historically 
transmitted patterns of masculinist behavior and belief which trade unionists and 
left-wing politicians were consistently unwilling to challenge. C431 
We can best express the relevance of this to the discussion of the public sphere 
by considering the relationship of the private and the public. Now, the specification 
of a public sphere necessarily implies the existence of another sphere that's private, 
and by contrast with what Habermas sometimes implies, as Fraser has argued, the 
boundaries between these two domains are not fast but permeable. The discussion 
here is also complicated by the recent revival of theorizing around "civil society": 
as John Keane reminds us, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the state/civil 
society couplet was operated by political theorists in a rich variety ways; we 
might add that such diversity is compounded by the difficulties of distinguishing 
the autonomies of the private realm in these traditions (e.g. where does the economic 
belong in this three-way schema of state/civil society/private sphere; how far 
is morality the vector of an interventionism that transcends all three; how do 
we deal with subjectivity?); and it is by no means clear how Habermas's theory 
of the public sphere fits with this older tradition of thought. [ 4 4 ]  But allowing 
for this diversity of meanings, it may be useful to remind ourselves in a simplified 
way of the varying definition the public realm may be given. Is this a purely 
wpolitical" matter in the narrower sense of government and public administration, 
for instance, or should the legitimate reach of political intervention extend to 
other more "private" spheres like the economy, recreation, the 'family, sexuality, 
and inter-personal relations? Broadly speaking, there have been probably three 
main answers within the classical left-wing tradition: 
(a') a pure democratic one, stressing the political rights of democracy and 
based in a clear separation of the public from the private sphere, in 
which the constitution guarantees strong rights of autonomy to the latter 
through civil freedoms, freedom of conscience and religion, property 
rights, rights of privacy, and so on. 
(b) a socialist one, in which the public sphere of democracy becomes extended 
to the economy through nationalization, the growth of the public sector., 
. trade unionism, the welfare state and other forms of socialized public 
provision in the areas of health care, social insurance, education, 
recreation, and so on; 
( c )  a utopian one, in which democracy becomes radically extended to social 
, relations as a whole, including large areas of personal life, domestic 
living arrangements, and childraising, usually in the form of some 
kind of communitarianism. 
Now, in the period since 1968 we may add a fourth version of this relationship 
between the public and the private, which subjects each of the above to searching 
critique, and that is the feminist one. Aside from facing the earlier versions 
with the need to address the interests/aspirations of women as well as men, the 
feminist version brings the principle of democracy to the center of the private 
sphere in a qualitatively different way. It systematically politicizes the personal 
dimension of social relations in a way which transforms the public/private distinction 
--in terms of family, sexuality, self, and subjectivity. Obviously, contemporary 
feminism is not without its antecedents. Thus the utopian socialists of the 1830s 
and 1840s had politicized the personal sphere in ways that seem strikingly radical 
when set against the staider preoccupations of the later nineteenth-century socialist 
tradition. Strong notions of women's reproductive rights and liberated sexuality 
could also be found on the margins of the left between the 1880s and 1914, and 
more extensively in the cultural radicalism of 1917-23. But it is only really in 
the last third of the twentieth century that the gendered characteristics of the 
classical public sphere have been properly opened to critique--by elaborating theories 
of sexuality and subjectivity, identifying ideologies of motherhood, confronting 
the sexual division of,labor in households, and developing a critique of the family 
as such. As Pateman says: 
"The meaning of 'civil society '...has been constructed through the 
exclusion of women and all that we symbolize ... To create a properly 
democratic society, which includes women as full citizens, it is 
necessary to deconstruct and reassemble our understanding of the body 
politic. This task extends from the dismantling of the patriarchal 
separation of private and public, to a transformation of our individ- 
uality and sexual identities as feminine and masculine beings. These 
identities now stand opposed, part of the multifaceted expression of 
the patriarchal dichotomy between reason and desire. The most profound 
and complex problem for political theory and practice is how the two 
bodies of humankind and feminine and masculine individuality can be 
fully incorporated into political life. How can the present of patriarchal 
domination, opposition and duality be transformed into a future of auton- 
omous, democratic differentiation?" [45] 
State Formation and the Public Sphere 
Despite the richness--empirically and imaginatively--of Habermas's account of the 
formation of (West) European political culture in the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, there is little discussion of the state per se or of specific political 
histories, at least in the senses we've become familiar with during the last two 
decades, whether via the state-theoretical literatures generated/provoked by 
Marxists in the 1970s or in the more heterogeneous work on state formation, which 
was already under way when Habermas conceived his book in the 1950s and early 1960s 
(most obviously associated with the influence of the Committee on Comparative Politics 
of the USA SSRC set up in 1954). At the same time, while this omission is significant 
(in that it has a necessary bearing on how the overall problematic of modern political 
development is constructed/implied in Habermas's text), Habermas's purpose was 
different and legitimately specific, concerned, as we have seen, with the "free 
space" of society rather than a state-centered approach to public authority or political 
development. He also has lots to say with relevance to the latter, particularly 
in his extensive and very interesting discussions of the law. Moreover, if we 
consider the major contributions to the historical discussion of comparative political 
development produced since the late-1960s (most of them by non-historians in the 
professional sense, incidentally), they have remarkably little to say to the 
questions of the public sphere and political culture formation raised by Habermas, 
namely: Barrington Moore Jr. and Charles Tilly, both of whom pioneered the turn 
by US sociology to history in this area; Immanuel Wallerstein's studies of the 
"modern world-system", Perry Anderson's of absolutism, and Theda Skocpol's of 
"states and social revolutions"; and the more recent and differently accented 
projects of Anthony Giddens and Michael Mann. Wallerstein is only secondarily 
concerned with political, as opposed to economic, history; Anderson deals with 
state-society relations, but for an earlier period and at a level of generality 
that makes it hard to engage with Habermas's questions (the latter will' in any case 
be more pertinent to the next instalment of Anderson's project, viz. the comparative 
analysis of bourgeois revolutions); Skocpol focuses rather stolidly on the state 
in the narrower sense, as a central nexus of government institutions.. Tilly's 
work on collective action and state formation brings us closer to political culture, 
but deals with "the extractive and repressive activities of states" rather than 
the cultural and ideological ones. Barrington Moore poses the problem of comparative 
-political development through the gross interactions of social forces ("lord and 
peasant in the making of the modern world"), and has little directly to say about 
the structure of states, the shaping of a public sphere or the contribution of 
urban classes. Neither Mann nor Giddens have anything to say about the public sphere 
in the sense discussed by this paper; the former's forthcoming second volume may 
well treat this theme directly, but the latter's discussion of "Class, Sovereignty 
and Citizenship" is bizarrely perfunctory and deals with the subject under an entirely 
"administrative" perspective. [46] Each of these otherwise extremely interesting 
works pays little attention to political culture, to the wider impact of the state 
in society and the modalities of popular consent and opposition, or to the social 
processes from which political activity ultimately derived. From this point of 
view, Habermas's translation of the discussion onto a socio-cultural terrain, 
particularly for its time, represents a welcome'shift of perspective and might 
well have found greater resonance in the literature on state formation than it has. 
As a view of political development, though, Habermas's framework has a number 
of drawbacks, some of which have already been mentioned. For one thing, by using 
a model of communicative rationality to mark the rise of liberalism and the constit- 
utionalizing of arbitrary authority, and by stressing the transition to a more 
interventionist state under advanced capitalism, he strongly implies a weak state 
during the classical public sphere's period of initial formation. But it is unclear 
how the boundaries between state and society are to be drawn from Habermas's analysis 
of this period. bJas W l ~ m l  state really so uninterested in regulating the private 
sphere or so non-interventionist in the resolution of social and political conflict? 
Habermas is very good on the legal reforms necessary to promote and ratify the changing 
bases of property, and as Karl Polanyi always insisted, the road to .laissez-faire 
was paved in state intervention. The same was true of socio-cultural and political, 
no less than of economic freedoms: to de-regulate society, and confirm a protected 
space for the public, an entire regulative program was required. 1471 Secondly, 
and in a similar vein, Habermas's argument idealizes the element of rational discourse 
in the formation of the public sphere, and neglects the extent to which its instit- 
utions were founded on sectionialism, exclusiveness, and repression. In eighteenth- 
century Britain parliamentary liberty and the rule of law were inseparable from 
the attack on customary rights, popular liberties, and nascent radical democracy, 
as Edward Thompson's work has so eloquently reminded us. [48] As 1 suggested above, 
the participants in the bourgeois public always faced two ways in this sense--forwards 
in confrontation with the old aristocratic and royal authorities, but also backwards 
against the popular/plebeian elements already in pursuit. We can't grasp the 
ambiguities of the liberal departure--the-consolidation of the classical public 
sphere in the period, say, between 1760 and 1850--without acknowledging the fragility 
of the liberal commitments and the element of contestation in this sense. It's 
only by extending Habermas's idea in this direction--towards the wider public domain, 
where authority is not only constituted as rational and legitimate, but where its 
terms may also be contested and modified (and occasionally overthrown) by society's 
subaltern groups--that we can accommodate the complexity. 
For this purpose, I want to suggest, an additional concept may be introduced, 
namely, Antonio Gramsci's idea of "hegemony". Some basic awareness of this is 
now fairly extensive, but, while there is now no shortage of careful critical 
exegesis around Gramsci's own intentions, the wider usage can be ill-informed and 
glib, and it is important to clarify the purposes the idea is meant to serve. 
It is worth beginning with Gwyn A. Williams' useful definition, which was also 
the form in which most of us first encountered the concept before the more extensive 
translation and discussion of Gramsci's thought in the 1970s: hegemony signifies 
"an order in which a certain way of life and thought is dominant, 
in which one concept of reality is diffused throughout society in 
all its institutional and private manifestations, informing with 
its spirit all taste, morality, customs, religious and political 
principles, and all social relations, particularly in their intell- 
ectual and moral connotation". [49] 
Now, this is f h s  far zs it goes, but it can also license a number of misconceptions, 
so several points need to be made in elaboration. First, hegemony should not be 
used interchangeably with llideologyw or "ideological domination tout court in a 
perspective stressing the  manipulation^^^ or "social control" deliberately exercised 
by a ruling class. As Raymond Williams says in the course of a brilliant exposition: 
hegemony comprises "not only the conscious system of ideas and beliefs [i.e. "ideology" 
in a commonly accepted sense] but the whole lived social process as practically 
organized by specific dominant meanings and valuesn, "a sense of reality for most 
people in the society, a sense of absolute because experienced reality beyond which 
it is very difficult for most members of the society to move, in most areas of their 
livesM. Hegemony should be seen 
"as in effect a saturation of the whole process of living--not only 
of political or economic activity, nor only of manifest social activity, 
but of the whole substance of lived identities and relationships, to 
such a depth that the pressures and limits of what can ultimately be 
seen as a specific economic, political and cultural system seem to most 
of us the pressures and limits of simple experience and common sense. 
Hegemony is then not only the articulate upper level of 'ideology', nor 
are its forms of control only those ordinarily seen as 'manipulation' 
or 'indoctrination1. It is the whole body of practices and expectations, 
over the whole of living: our senses and assignments of energy, or 
shaping perceptions of ourselves and our worldw. [50] 
This sense of completeness and externally structured experience, of "the wholeness 
of the process" by which a given social order holds together and acquires its legitimacy. 
is the most obvious feature of Gramsci's idea. [51] 
Secondly, however, Gramscils idea of hegemony was not a "totalitarianN concept 
(contrarv to some of the older commentaries of the 1950s and 1960s, such as H. 
Stuart ~ b ~ h e s ,  Consciousness and Society [NY, 19581, pp. 96-104). In fact, he 
used it carefully to distinquish elements of pluralism and competition, of persuasion 
and consent, from the more-repressive and coercive forms of rule and the conventional 
process of governing in the administrative sense. Though he takes careful note of 
direct interventions by the state against society to suppress opposition, to contain 
dissent, and to manipulate educational, religious and other ideological apparatuses 
for the production of popular compliance, therefore, Gramsci expressly links , 
hegemony to a domain of public life (which he calls "civil societyw, but which 
might be called the "public sphere") which is relatively independent of such controls, 
and hence makesits achievement a,far more.contingent process. To establish its 
supremacy, in Gramsci's view, a dominant class must not only impose its rule via 
the state, it must also demonstrate its claims to "intellectual and moral leadership", 
and this requires the. arts of persuasion, a continuous labor of creative ideological 
intervention. The capacity "to articulate different visions of the world in such 
a way that their potential antagonism is neutralized", rather than simply suppressing 
those visions beneath "a uniform conception of the world", is the essence of hegemony 
in Gramsci Is sense. [ 5 2 ]  But by. the same virtue, hegemony is also susceptible 
to change and negotiation--not just because it involves the pursuit of consent under 
conditions of pluralism (however limited), but also because this process nonetheless 
operates through social relations of dominance and subordination structured by class 
inequality, and therefore involves contradictory and opposing interests. Thirdly, 
therefore, hegemony is characterized by uncertainty, impermanence, and contradiction. 
As I put it with Keith Nield on an earlier occasion, hegemony "is not a fixed and 
immutable condition, more or less permanent until totally displaced by determined 
revolutionary action, but is an institutionally negotiable process in which the 
social and political forces of contest, breakdown and transformation are constantly 
in playw. [531 In this sense, hegemony is always in the process of construction, 
because bringing the process to closure would entail either a utopia of social harmony 
or the replacement 0.f hegemonic by coercive rule. Hegemony is always open to modific- 
ation, and under specific circumstances may be more radically transformed or even 
(though not very often) break down altogether. Thus civil society provides opportun- 
ities for contestinq as well as securinqthe legitimacy of the system. More than 
anything else, then, hegemony has "to be won, secured, constantly defendedn. 
It requires "a struggle to win over the dominated classes in which any 'resolution' 
involves both limits (compromises) and systematic contradictionst1. [ 5 4 ]  The dominance 
of a given social group has to be continually renegotiated in accordance with the 
fluctuating economic, cultural, and political strengths of the sobordinate classes. 
Gramsci's distinction between "hegemonic" and "coercive" forms of rule is also 
operated historically. That is, developed capitalist polities whose.legitimacy 
rests on a fairly stable "equilibrium of hegemonic and coercive institutions" are 
directly contrasted with an older type of state that lacks this vital reciprocity 
with civil society: 
"In the ancient and medieval state alike, centralization, whether 
political-territorial or social. ..was minimal. .The state was, in 
a certain sense, a mechanical bloc of social groups ... The modern 
state substitutes for the mechanical bloc of social groups their 
subordination to the active hegemony of the directive and dominant 
group, hence abolishes certain autonomies, which nevertheless are 
reborn in other forms, as parties, trade unions, cultural associations". 
[551  
The passage from one type of state to another presupposes processes of social change 
which allow new political ambitions to be crystallized. For Gramsci, the latter 
consist of three moments: (a) the growth of corporate solidarities; (b) their 
organization into a larger class collectivity; and (c) their translation onto the 
highest political plane of "universal1' interest. With the development of the last 
of these aspirations, the process of hegemonic construction may be said to have 
begun, with the growth of a new "national-popularu dimension to public life, and 
a new claim to "intellectual and moral leadership" in the society as a whole. It 
is'in the context. of such a history that the institutional landscape of civil society 
gradually takes shape. In a now famous and much-quoted passage, Gramsci hinted 
at. the comparative possibilities of this approach: 
"In Russia the state was everything, civil society was primordial 
and gelatinous; in the West there was a proper relation between 
state and civil society, and when the state trembled a sturdy structure 
of civi'l society was at once revealed. The state was only an outer 
ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system of fortresses and 
earthworks". [ 5 6 ]  
For Gramsci, this contrast was specifically a way of explaining the success 
of the Bolsheviks in the Russian Revolution, which simultaneously illustrated the 
fundamentally different strategy required of the Left in Western Europe, where the 
greater complexity of the social fabric, the liberal traditions of citizenship and 
constitutionalism, and the functioning pluralism of the political system meant that 
power was diffused more intangibly through a wide variety of non-official practices 
and organizations, as opposed to being physically embodied in a central core of 
state institutions in the capital city: if in Russia the backwardness of civil 
society left the state an isolated citidel which could then be stormed, in the West 
the structures of existing society were far more complex, requiring a long-term 
war of position on the part of a revolutionary opposition, and not the insurrectionary 
war of movement. For our purposes, nineteenth-century Russia provides an excellent 
counter-example for the growth of the public sphere. It displayed the absence of 
all those processes--particularly the emancipatory impulse of free associational 
initiative, which under Tsarism was precluded by a combination of social backwardness 
and repressive state authority--which Habermas's concept of Oeffentlichkeit presupposed. 
Popular Culture and the Public Sphere 
Of course, for Gramsci civil society was not quite the neutral context for the 
emergence of rational political discourse in the ideal and abstract sense intended 
by Habermas. As I have argued, it was an arena of contested meanings, in which 
different--and opposing--publics m& for space, and from which certain "publics" 
(women, subordinate nationalities, popular classes like the urtian poor, the working 
class and the peasantry) may have been excluded altogether. Moreover, this element 
of contest was not just a matter of coexistence, in which such alternative publics 
participated in a tolerant pluralism of tendencies and groupings; such competition 
also occurred in class-divided societies structured by inequality, and consequently 
questions of domination and subordination--power, in its economic, social, cultural 
and political dimensions--were also involved. That being so, hegemony--as the 
harnessing of public life to the interests of one particular group, i.e. a social 
bloc ordered around the dominant classes--had to be systematically worked at, whether 
consciously and programmatically (as in the early stages of such a process of hegemonic 
cor~struction), or increasingly as the "natural" and unreflected administration or 
reproduction of a given way of doing things. Intellectuals in Gramsci's schema--3s 
a broadtnzd social category, including journalists, party officials, teachers, 
priests, lawyers, technicians, and other professionals, as well as writers, 
professors and intellectuals in the narrower conventional sense--were the fvnctionaries 
of thi 5 process. 
I want to explore this element of conflict--the fractured and contested character 
of the public sphere--by looking again at the latter's constitutive moment as Habermas 
presents it in the later-eighteenth century in Britain; and I want to do so by drawing 
on the extremely interesting work of Gunther Lottes, who (by contrast with most 
of the Anglo-American work on the subject) is well familiar with Habermas's framework, 
and indeed uses it to develop his arament. 1571 Lottest book is .a reworkina of a key 
part of Edward Thompson's ~aking of lhe ~nqlish Working Class, and rev6lves around 
a careful analysis of the emergence of a radical intelligentsia and its relationship 
to a plebiean public in later eighteenth-century ~ngland; conducted in two stages. 
During the first, in the 1770s and 1780s, radical intellectuals postulated a 
regeneration of the constitution through popular education and parliamentary reform. 
The corruption and besetting factionalism of the governing system were to be challenged 
by an extra-parliamentary campaign of public enlightenment. At this stage, Lottes 
argues, the links between intelligentsia and public were external rather than organic, 
asserted at the level of principle and propaganda, but not yet consummated through 
new forms of communication or structures of popular participation. Moreover, this 
earlier intelligentsia was recruited from the upper reaches of society, from three 
overlapping groups of notables [ Honorat ioren] : landowners, merchants, and other 
propsperous businessmen, whose intellectual pursuits presumed (though not complacently) 
the material security of their social position; representatives of the academic 
professions, mainly lawyers and Nonconformist clergy; and the literati and writers 
in the narrower sense, newly constituted as a separate profession by the emergent 
literary market-place. Their activity was loosely structured around London's coffee- 
house-society, in the discussion circles and debating clubs typified by the Robin- 
Hood Society, the Speculative Society, or the Debating Society in Coachmakerst - 
Hall. If anything the provincial counterparts were more ramified and vital, certainly 
in the major centers of Manchester and Birmingham. At the political apex was the 
Society for Constitutional Information founded in 1780, which remained the principal 
forum of the radical intelligentsia until the launching of the London Corresponding 
Society (LCS) in 1792. Thus far, it may be thought, Lottes1 account fits very 
nicely into Habermas1s framework, and adds further to the illustrative materials 
provided by Brewer, Money, and others discussed earlier above. But the subsequent 
unfolding of his argument is more subversive. 
- 
-At one level, the reform movement of the 1780s, which was expressly committed 
to the creation of an extra-parliamentary public, broke the existing frame of legit- 
imate politics. By seeking to educate the general populace into citizenship, the 
pre-Jacobin radicals raised the issue of universal manhood suffrage and broke "with 
the previously uncontested dogma of political theory that property alone justified 
a claim to political participation". 1581 Yet at the same time, the Society for 
Constitutional Information made no attempt at direct popular mobilization. This, 
the open agitation of the masses within a new practice of participatory democracy, 
occurred only with the second of Lottesl two stages, that of the English Jacobinism 
proper. As the organizing instance of the new activity, the LCS then had two 
distnguishing features. By comparison with the earlier radicals its leadership 
was drawn more broadly from the less prestigious and established circles of the 
intelligentsia--not only recognized intellectuals like the merchant's son Maurice 
Margaret, the Unitarian minister Jeremiah Joyce, or the lawyers Felix Vaughan, 
John Frost and John Martin, but also "not yet arrived or declassed marginal existences 
of the London literary-publicistic scene" like John Gale Jones, Joseph Gerrald, 
William Hodgson, the Binns brothers (John and Benjamin), or John Thelwall ("the 
prototype of the literatus from a modest background who tried vainly for years to 
find a foothold in the London artistic and literary scene"), the numerous small 
publishers and book dealers, and the "first representatives of an artisan intellig- 
entsia" like the shoemaker Thomas Hardy, the silversmith John Baxter, the hatter 
Richard Hodgson, or the tailor Francis Place. 159) Then secondly, this new Jacobin 
intelligentsia set out deliberately to mobilize the masses, by carrying the work 
of political education into the turbulent reaches of the plebeian culture itself. 
Thus the key to the LCS1s originality was its relationship to the ebullient 
but essentially pre-political culture of the urban masses, what Lottes calls Itthe 
socio-cultural and institutional context of the politicization of the petty and 
sub-bourgeois strata". 160) In adopting the democratic principle of "members 
unlimitedu, the LC5 committed itself not only to a program of popular participation, 
but also to a "confrontation with the traditional plebeian culture", of which it 
was certainly no uncritical admirer. As Lottes says: "The Jacobin ideal of the 
independent, well-informed and disciplined citizen arriving at decisions via 
enlightened and free discussion stood in crass contradiction with the forms of 
communication and political action characteristic of the plebeian culture". 161) 
In other words, riot, revelry and rough music were to be replaced by the political 
modalities of the pamphlet, committee-room, resolution and petition, supplemented 
where necessary by the disciplined democracy of an orderly open-air demonstration. 
The most valuable parts of Lottesl account are those exploring the practicalities 
of this departure--in the meticulous constitutionalism of the LCS, in the creation 
of an atmosphere for rational political discussion, in the radicals' critique of 
the "mobw, and in the details of their "enlightenment praxis". A new "plebeian 
pub1 ic sphereM [plebejische Oef fent lichkei t ] emerged from these endeavors, nourished 
on the intense political didacticism of the LCS sections, a rich diet of pamphlets, 
tracts and political magazines, and the theatrical pedagogy of Thelwall's Political 
Lectures. Unlike the radicals of the 1780s, the Jacobins entered into a direct 
relationship with their putative public, and unlike conventional parliamentarians 
they did so in a non-manipulative and non-demagogic way. 
This was the real significance of the popular radicalism of the 1790s in Britain. 
It was more than a mere stage in the long-term movement towards parliamentary reform 
between the 1760s and 1832, and more than a mere epiphenomenon of the deeper trend 
towards extra-parliamentary uassociationn. It was more also than the founding moment 
of the nineteenth-century labor movement (which was how it was mainly presented 
in the older labor history and allied accounts). It was a specific attempt--defined 
by the global context of the "Atlantic Revolution", the national dynamics of the 
movement for parliamentary reform, the complex sociology of the English intelligentsia, 
and the political economy of the London and provincial handicrafts--to educate the 
masses into citizenship. It should be viewed as 
"partly the achievement and partly the continuing expression of a 
comprehensive effort at enlightenment and education, aimed at bringing 
the urban stratum of small tradesmen and artisans to the point where 
they could articulate their social and political discontent no longer 
in the pre-political protest rituals of the traditional plebeian culture, 
but instead in a political movement with firm organization, a middle 
and long-term strategy, and a theoretically grounded program". 1621 
As such, it was as much the "end product of the bourgeois enlightenment of the 
eighteenth centuryv1 as it was the herald of the nineteenth-century working-class 
movement. As Albert Goddwin, another historian of the English Jacobinism, puts 
it, the tradesmen, shopkeepers and mechanics addressed by the LCS were to be 
educated into political knowledge not just to ensure "their more effective particip- 
ation in politics", but "to rid society of the turbulence and disorder which was 
then often inseparable from the ventilation of popular grievances". 1631 
At the same time, there were definite limits to the English Jacobins' possible 
achievement. For one thing the advanced democracy of the LCS presumed the very 
maturity and sophistication it was meant to create. The goals of political pedagogy 
were hard to reconcile with the competing demands of effective organization, creative 
leadership, and maximum participation of the members--what Lottes calls "the 
triangular tension of organizational effectiveness, fundamental democratic 
consciousness at the grass roots, and educational mission1I 1641--particularly 
when government repression was stepped up after 1793. Moreover, tactically it 
was hard to confront the l'backwardnessl' of the popular culture too intransigently 
without beginning to compromise the resonance of the radical propaganda and 
undermining the movement's basic democratic legitimacy. The Jacobins n-ere also 
confined in a different direction by the tenacity of the dominant eighteenth-century 
oppositionist ideology--a potent combination of "Countryu ideology and natural 
rights thinking--which stressed the degeneration of an originally healthy const,it- 
ution and raised serious obstacles to the adoption of Tom Painelsmore radical 
break with the English constitutional tradition. In this respect the Jacobin 
radicals remained dependent on the intellectual legacy of the 1780s, and most of 
their distinctive achievements (e .g. Thelwall ' s -social as opposed to his political 
theory) were well within the limits of this earlier tradition. 1651 
Lottes' account nicely brings together the points I've been trying to make 
(although it should be said straight away that his discussion remains as gender 
blind as Habermas's own). On the one hand, the actual pursuit of communicative 
rationality via the modalities of the public sphere at the end of the eighteenth 
century reveals a far richer social history than Habermas's conception of a specif- 
ically bourgeois emancipation allows; on the other hand, Habermas ' s concentration 
on Oeffentlichkeit as a specifically bourgeois category subsumes forms of popular 
democratic mobilization that were always already present as contending and subversive 
alternatives to the classical liberal organization of civil society in which Habermas's 
ideal'of the public sphere is confined. From a vantage-point in 1989, when the 
French Revolution is being divested of its radical democratic and popular progressive 
content, and discussion of the latter returned to certain Cold War simplicities 
of the 1950s (as 'Ithe origins of totalitarian democracy"), apparently without serious 
dispute, it is no unimportant matter to point to the foreshortening of Habermas's 
conception in this respect. (Of course, this is - not to convict Jurgen Habermas 
himself of the same ideological syndrome; merely to identify a difficulty that 
need<-clarification). My four headings of discussion--the findings of current social 
history, the problem of gender, processes of state formation, and the question 
of popular politics--are not the only ones under which Habermas's work could be 
considered historically. A more extensive discussion of nineteenth-century nationalist 
movements, or the literature on communications, or the question of popular/mass 
culture in the Frankfurt School's notation, would all have been interesting cand- 
idates for inclusion. More fundamentally, perhaps, the lllinguistic turn1' and 
the "new cultural history1' could also be used to cast Habermas1s work in an interesting 
critical light, as Habermas's own recent engagement with the legacy of Foucault 
has already made clear. In particular, the claim to rational discourse, certainly 
in the social and gendered exclusiveness desired by the late-eighteenth-century 
bourgeoisie, was simultaneously a claim to power in Foucault's sense, and given 
the extent of Foucaultls influence during the last decade a whole other discussion 
might have been developed around this insight. To repeat: none of this diminishes 
the value and interest of Habermas1s original intervention, particularly given 
its timing three decades ago. My purpose has not been to dismiss the latter, but 
to indicate some of the ways in which it needs to be clarified and extended. 
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